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INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez,1 walking that takes place during the workday may not only be good
for employees’ health, but may also be good for their paychecks as any time
employees spend walking after the donning of and prior to the doffing of
required safety equipment must now be compensated under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  While this is good news for employees, it is not good news to
numerous employers for a several reasons.  Based on the Supreme Court’s
decision, employers are likely to face increases in liability and expenditures;
increases in expenditures are most likely to take the form of litigation, labor,
and restructuring costs, and will also include costs associated with
implementing new workplace rules and policies regarding the donning and
doffing of protective equipment and any related walking, and new time-
keeping policies.  Additionally, while not employer-specific problems, the
application of the decision to the reality of the workplace creates opportunities
for different compensation treatment of relatively similarly situated
employees.
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This note will begin with a review of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez.2  This will include a review of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,3 as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,4 the facts of
the Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.5 and Tum v. Barber Foods6 cases, the resolution of
each case at the intermediate appellate court level, and the Supreme Court’s
ultimate resolution of the consolidated cases.  The note will then look at
whether the Court, through its decision, has undermined the Congressional
intent behind the Portal-to-Portal Act,7 discuss the differential treatment of
relatively similarly situated workers resulting from the application of this
decision, and look into the substantial expenditures that employers may now
face in the form of litigation, labor, plant restructuring, and workplace policy
development costs.
I.  IBP, INC. V. ALVAREZ
A.  Introduction
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act8 (“FLSA”) in 1938 to end
labor practices adversely affecting “the health, efficiency, and general well-
being of workers.”9  The act requires employers to “compensate employees for
all of the time which the employer requires or permits employees to work.”10
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co.,11 where the Court held that the time employees spent walking to
and from their workstations and engaging in preliminary activities12 was
compensable under the FLSA, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of
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1947.13  The Portal-to-Portal Act served to limit the Court’s broad
interpretation of compensable activities under the FLSA, and provides in
relevant part
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to liability or
punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended . . . on account of
the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee
overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such
employee engaged in on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the
principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or
activities, which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which
such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at
which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.14
The employees of IBP and Barber Foods brought separate actions against
their respective employers, and these actions were later consolidated by the
Supreme Court.  The employees alleged that the employers’ failure to
compensate employees for time spent donning and doffing protective
equipment, time spent walking between donning and doffing areas and
workstations, and time spent waiting to don and doff protective gear violated
the FLSA.  The issues presented to the Supreme Court for determination were
whether the time spent walking between donning and doffing areas and
workstations, and the time spent waiting to don protective equipment were
compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act.15
B.  Facts
Barber Foods, a processor of poultry-based products, requires all of its
employees to wear a lab coat, hairnet, ear plugs, and safety glasses; depending
on the job classification, it requires the additional wearing of safety boots,
bump hats, back belts, vinyl aprons, vinyl gloves, cotton glove liners, and
sleeve covers.16  All of the above items of clothing and equipment, except for
safety glasses, aprons, gloves, and sleeve covers are donned before punching
in and doffed after punching out.17  As for required equipment, the lab coats
132 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 26:129
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Brief for Respondent at 3, Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 29 (2005) (No. 04-66). 
22. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 898.
23. Id. at 898 n.2.
24. Id.
25. Brief for Respondent at 17, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005) (No. 03-1238).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 898.
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are retrieved by employees at a location “between the entrance and the
equipment cage,”18 and hairnets, earplugs, gloves, sleeve covers and aprons
are gathered at the equipment cage.19  At the end of the shift, employees place
lab coats and glove liners in bins, which are located between the production
floor and the plant exits, to be laundered; gloves, sleeve covers and aprons are
thrown away, and “bump hats, back belts, safety goggles, safety boots and
reusable earplugs” can either be stored in the employees’ locker or taken
home.20  Employees are paid from the time they punch in, and time clocks are
located at the entrances of the production floor and on the production floor.21
IBP, a supplier of beef and pork, requires all of the employees at its
Pasco, Washington meat processing facility to wear designated general
clothing and equipment, and additional unique clothing and equipment
dependent upon job classification.22  All employees must wear sanitary outer
garments, hair nets, ear plugs, hardhats, gloves, “liquid-repelling sleeves,
aprons, and leggings,”23 and safety boots.  Knife-using employees may wear
additional protective equipment including metal mesh vests, sleeves, gloves,
and aprons.24
In general, slaughter workers gather their supplies at the supply room and
then go to the locker room where they retrieve protective equipment and don
the clothing and equipment.25  Slaughter workers then proceed to get knives
in the knife-room or at “several distribution points.”26  Processing workers
retrieve frocks at one station, proceed to the locker room to gather additional
equipment and clothing, and then don the equipment.27  The Washington plant
has four locker rooms.28  After production, employees are required to clean
their equipment, and return it to its respective location.29  While a time card
system is in place at the plant, employees are paid according to a “gang time”
model under which compensation begins with processing of the first piece of
meat, and ends with the processing of the last piece of meat.30
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washing up after work, like the changing of clothes, may in certain situations be so directly related
to the specific work the employee is employed to perform that it would be regarded as an integral
part of the employee’s “principal activity.”  This does not necessarily mean, however, that travel
between the washroom or clothes-changing place and the actual place of performance of the specific
work the employee is employed to perform, would be excluded from the type of travel to which
Section 4(a) refers.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 282.
38. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
C.  Case History
In Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc.,31 the First Circuit followed the reasoning
of Steiner v. Mitchell32 to hold that the time spent donning and doffing
required protective equipment was compensable as such activities were
“integral to the principal activity” of processing poultry-based products.33  The
court held, however, that the time spent walking subsequent to donning and
prior to doffing (when traveling between donning and doffing areas and
production stations) was not compensable because the Portal-to-Portal Act
generally exempts walking “to and from the actual place of performance of the
principal activity and activities which such employee is employed to perform,”
and “activities which are preliminary and postliminary to an employee’s
principal activity or activities”34 from compensation.  The court rejected the
arguments that the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes only walking that occurs
before an employee’s commencement of a principal activity,35 and that the
donning and doffing activities, as integral and indispensable activities, marked
the start and end of the workday.36
It should also be noted that the court found the time employees spent
waiting in line to receive the required protective equipment non-compensable
because “waiting time would qualify as a preliminary or postliminary activity
under the Portal-to-Portal Act.”37
In Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.,38 the Ninth Circuit also found that the time spent
donning and doffing unique protective equipment was compensable as it was
“integral and indispensable” to the principal activity of meat processing.
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Hence, the donning and doffing fell under “Steiner’s exception to the Portal-
to-Portal Act’s bar to compensation of preliminary or postliminary
activities.”39  The court then diverged from the reasoning of the First Circuit
to find that the time spent walking to and from production stations after
donning or doffing unique protective equipment was compensable.40  Unlike
the First Circuit, the court reasoned that workday began with the donning of
unique protective equipment because donning was a “preliminary activity that
was ‘integral and indispensable’ to the work.”41  Thus, all activities occurring
thereafter were part of the workday and compensable.42
The question of whether employees should be compensated for the time
they spent waiting in line to receive required protective equipment or clothing
was not before the Ninth Circuit.
D.  Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Employees and their amici argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Steiner43 mandated a finding that donning and doffing required by IBP and
Barber Foods constituted principal activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act as
the donning and doffing were an “integral part of and indispensable to” the
principal activity of meat slaughtering and processing.44  Given donning and
doffing’s status as principal activities, the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exclusion of
time spent walking “to and from the actual place of performance of the
principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform”
from compensation was inapplicable; 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) only applies to
walking and preliminary or postliminary activities “which occur either prior
to the time . . . such employee commences, or subsequent to the time . . . at
which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.”45  Because the walking
took place after a principal activity, donning, and prior to a principal activity,
doffing, it should be exempt from the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Moreover, to support their claim that principal activities begin the
workday, and that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not alter the compensability of
acts performed within the workday, the employees and their amici relied on
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the bill’s Senate Report46 and administrative regulations.47  For example,
Senate Report No. 48, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947) states that “workday”
as used in the Portal-to-Portal Act means “that period of the workday between
the commencement by the employee, and the termination by the employee, of
the principal activity or activities which such employee was employed to
perform.”  In regard to the argument that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not alter
the compensability of acts performed within the workday, the Senate Report
provides that “activities which take place during the workday . . . . are not
affected by [29 U.S.C. § 254(a)] and such activities will continue to be
compensable. . . .”48
In the alternative, the employees argued that if the walking did take place
outside of the workday, the time spent walking was still compensable as an
activity that is an “integral part of and indispensable to” the principal activity
of donning and doffing.49  The employees put forth the same argument in
regards to time spent waiting to don and doff required protective equipment.50
Employers and their amici agreed that the donning and doffing of
required protective equipment was an “integral part of and indispensable to”
the principal activity of meat processing, and therefore, compensable under
Steiner.  The employers then diverged from the employees’ argument in two
ways.  First, the employers argued that an activity that was integral and
indispensable to a principal activity was not necessarily a principal activity in
and of itself, and therefore, the activity was insufficient to trigger the start of
the working day.51  Second, the employers argued that “principal activity or
activities” as used in section 4(a)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)] referred to the
“‘specific work’ the employee is employed to perform,” and that “‘actual
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place of performance’ in [section 4(a)(1)] is the place where the employee
performs the specific work he is employed to perform. . . .”52  In short, the
principal activity referred to in 4(a)(1) in was the processing or slaughtering
of meat, and the place of the principal activity was the production floor.53  In
other words, an activity could be integral and indispensable to a principal
activity under section 4(a)(2) [29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2)], and hence be
compensable, but not be a principal activity that triggered the beginning or end
of a workday.54  Under both arguments, any time spent walking or waiting
would occur before the commencement of the principal activity or after the
principal activity.  Therefore, any time spent walking and waiting would be
excluded from compensation by the express language of the Portal-to-Portal
Act.55
The employers further argued that compensating employees for time spent
donning and doffing, but not for any walking that occurred subsequent to
donning and prior to doffing was not incongruent with the continuous
workday rule as activities that were integral and indispensable to the principal
activity, but not a principal activity in and of themselves, did not start or end
the workday.  The principal activity that began the workday was the
processing or slaughtering of meat on the production floor.
Moreover, the employers and their amici argued that interpretive
regulations,56 the history and purpose of the Portal-to-Portal, and the
possibility of “incongruous treatment of similar situations”57 mandated a
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finding that walking subsequent to donning and prior to doffing was not
compensable.
E.  Decision
The Supreme Court held that time spent walking subsequent to donning
protective equipment and prior to doffing protective equipment was
compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act.58  To
reach this conclusion, the Court held that any activity that “is ‘integral and
indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity’ is itself a ‘principal activity’ under
section 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.”59  Therefore, donning and doffing
were principal activities.60  The Court then relied on the continuous workday
rule,61 and other regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor62 to
determine that since the donning of required protective equipment was a
principal activity, it began the continuous workday, and the Portal-to-Portal
Act’s exclusion of walking time from compensation was not applicable.63  In
short, since the donning, as a principal activity, commenced the workday, and
doffing, as a principal activity, ended the workday, walking that took place in
between was compensable as part of the continuous workday.
More specifically, the Supreme Court relied on the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor shortly after the passage of the Portal-
to-Portal Act to determine that the act did not change the Court’s earlier
descriptions of “work” or “workday,”64 except in regard to preliminary or
postliminary activities, and travel to and from the “actual place of
performance of the principal activity.”65  The act neither affected activities
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occurring after the first principal activity and before the last principal activity
of the day66 nor the definition of workday.67
In addition, the Court rejected the employer’s contention that an activity
could be compensable under section 4(a)(2) because it was “integral and
indispensable” to the principal activity, but that the same activity was not
necessarily the principal activity referred to in section 4(a)(1), and was not a
principal activity for the purposes of starting the workday.68  The court stated
that activities which are “integral and indispensable” to principal activities,
“are themselves ‘principal activities,’” and that “there is no plausible
argument that [principal activity or activities] mean something different in
section 4(a)(2) than they do in section 4(a)(1).”69
Finally, the Court determined that the time employees spent waiting to
don the unique protective equipment was not compensable as such waiting
qualified as a preliminary activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.70  The
argument that such waiting was “integral and indispensable” to the principal
activity of donning was rejected.71  While the Court recognized that such
waiting may be necessary at times, it is not always essential for the worker to
do his job.72  The waiting time associated with donning and doffing the
protective equipment will be compensable, however, if it falls within the
continuous workday.
II.  ANAL YSIS
Like other decisions, the fact that Alvarez was unanimously decided does
not save the case from scrutiny.  First, while characterizing this decision as
inconsistent with the purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act73 is somewhat of a
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stretch, the claim is not entirely without merit, especially when viewing the
Court’s resolution of this case with the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.74
decision, which prompted the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act.75  Second,
the application of the decision to the reality of the workplace leads to the
inconsistent and incongruent treatment of relatively similarly situated workers.
In addition, while the Court down-played employers’ potential liability
arising from this decision,76 the decision expands employers’ liability by
drawing a fine line between compensable and non-compensable time.
Moreover, as a result of the decision, additional costs will be imposed on
employers; employers may face increases in litigation, restructuring and labor
costs, and will face added costs associated with developing new workplace
policies and time-keeping systems.77
A.  Undermining the Portal-to-Portal Act
The FLSA does not define “work” or “workweek.”78  In Tennessee Coal,
Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,79 the Supreme Court defined
work as “meaning physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily
for the benefit of the employer and his business.”80  Under this definition of
work, the Court held81 that the time iron ore miners spent traveling
underground in the mines to and from the location where the miners were
drilling and loading ore was compensable.82
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,83 the Supreme Court defined
“workweek” as including “all time during which an employee is necessarily
required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a prescribed
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workplace.”84  In that case, employees at the company, a large percentage of
whom were compensated upon a piece work basis, punched in at the time
clocks, walked approximately 30 seconds to 8 minutes to their workstations,
and then “performed various preliminary duties, such as putting on aprons and
overalls, removing shirts, taping or greasing their arms, putting on finger cots,
preparing the equipment for productive work, turning on switches for lights
and machinery, opening windows and assembling and sharpening tools.”85
The Court found that the time employees spent walking from the time clock
to their respective workstations, and the time spent engaged in preliminary
activities was compensable since it met the definition of work established in
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad. Co. v. Muscoda Local.86
In response to this broad definition of work, and Congress’s perception
of an “existing emergency” resulting from claims, which if allowed in
accordance with Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., would have created
“wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in
operation,” the Portal-to-Portal Act was passed to remove such walking and
preliminary activities from compensation under the FLSA.87
In Steiner v. Mitchell,88 which was decided after the enactment of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, the Supreme Court held that “‘principal activity or
activities’ in section 4 embraces all activities which are ‘an integral and
indispensable part of the principal activities.’”89  At issue in the case was
whether battery plant employees had to be compensated for the time spent
changing clothes at the start of their shifts and showering at the end.90  The
Court found the time to be compensable as the activities were “integral and
indispensable” to the principal activity of battery making.  Therefore, they
were not excluded from compensation under section 4(a)(1).91  The Court
made certain to point out that the showering and clothes changing undertaken
by employees did not take place under normal conditions.92  Employees were
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regularly exposed to chemicals which are “toxic to human beings”93 and pose
a “very great”94 risk to employees and even family members.  The time spent
by the employees changing clothes and showering was estimated to be around
30 minutes each day.95
By finding donning and doffing of required protective equipment that is
more ordinary in nature, and that takes place in a work environment that more
closely resembles the working environment of blue-collared workers than the
workplace in Steiner,96 these two cases expand the scope of activities that will
be considered “principal activities” due to their “integral and indispensable”
relationship to the principal activity.97  While perhaps not problematic in and
of itself, a broader definition of “integral and indispensable” activities,
combined with the Supreme Court’s decision that such activities will mark the
boundaries of compensable time, threatens to undermine the Congressional
intent behind the Portal-to-Portal Act.98
There are two possible routes to undermine Congressional intent.  First,
as what constitutes an activity “integral and indispensable” to the principal
activity grows, what constitutes a preliminary or postliminary activity that is
exempt from compensation shrinks, and the congressionally created exception
in 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) is narrowed.  Second, under the reasoning of
Alvarez,99 “integral and indispensable” activities start and end the
compensable workday, which will narrow the congressionally created
exception in 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) that excludes certain walking, riding and
traveling time from compensation.
A look back at the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda
Local No. 123,100 and Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.101 decisions shows
how the Portal-to-Portal Act can be circumvented.  In Tennessee Coal, Iron
& Railroad Co., the ore miners spent time at the surface of the mine
“obtaining and returning tools, lamps and carbide,” and then traveled into the
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Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956), the Court found that the clothes changing and showering activities served
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106. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 57, at 13.
mine.102  In Anderson, the employees were allowed to change into their work
clothes, walk to their stations, and then perform various activities, “such as
putting on aprons and overalls, removing shirts, taping or greasing their arms,”
and putting on finger cots.103  In either case, if the employees had to perform
an activity that was “integral and indispensable” to their principal activities
before walking to the face of the mine or to their workstations, the time spent
walking would be compensable; this is the same outcome that the Court
reached in both of these cases only via a different legal route. 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s decision in IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez104 has effectively undermined the congressional intent behind the
Portal-to-Portal Act, but it does show that judicial boundaries are necessary
with regard to defining “integral and indispensable” activities.105  Such
boundaries are even more necessary given the fact that engagement in
“integral and indispensable” activities will now start the compensable
workday.
B.  Differential Treatment of Relatively Similarly Situated Employees
A more pressing issue is that this decision leads to the “incongruous
treatment of similar situations”106 when applied to the reality of employees’
workdays.  More specifically, the decision will result in differential treatment
of employees in terms of compensation based on whether the individual
employees are required to wear protective equipment, and where that
protective equipment is donned.  An argument can be made that the
differences in what an employee is required to don and doff, where he does so,
and in what order he does so, destroys the similar situation of employees (even
though they are doing like jobs in the same plant), and justifies varying
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compensation time.  However, while this may be acceptable to those in the
legal field, employees and companies that face the implementation of the
decision are unlikely to consider these substantial differences that justify
differences in compensation time.
As applied, the seemingly arbitrary and incongruent differences in
compensation between employees resulting from this decision can be seen
from several comparisons between two hypothetical employees beginning
their workday.  Beginning with a simple example, Employee A may enter the
plant, have an eight minute walk to his workstation, and not have to gather and
don any compensable gear before arriving at his work station.  His walk to the
workstation, and the time he spends waiting to punch in will not be
compensated.  Employee B may enter the plant, have to stop for a minute or
two to gather and don a piece of compensable protective equipment, and have
a similar eight minute walk to a workstation near Employee A.  After leaving
the changing area, the remainder of his walk will be compensated, and the
time Employee B spends waiting to punch in that will be compensated as
well.107
Differential treatment based on small differences in the gathering and
donning of required protective gear may not only result when two employees
walk similar paths to their workstations with one stopping to don a piece of
compensable equipment and the other not, but differential treatment may also
arise between employees who both gather compensable equipment.  Suppose
Employee A and Employee B both walk to their lockers to drop off personal
belongings before beginning their work.  Employee A has a piece of
compensable equipment in his locker which he dons, while Employee B has
only equipment whose donning is not compensable in his locker.  Employee
A and B then walk to an equipment station, where they both gather and don
a compensable piece of equipment.  Employee A has been compensated for
his walk from the locker room to the equipment station, but Employee B has
not been compensated for his same walk.108  Moreover, if there is a line at the
equipment station, Employee A will be compensated for the wait, but
Employee B will not.  Both, however, will be compensated for the subsequent
walk to their stations and the time they spend waiting to punch in.  Adding a
further variation to the hypothetical above, including a stop for equipment
whose donning is not compensable highlights this decision’s disparate effects
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on employee compensation.  Suppose that after leaving the locker room,
Employee A and Employee B both stop at an equipment station where they
gather and don equipment that has been determined to be non-compensable,
and then go to a second equipment station at which they gather and don
equipment that is compensable.  Employee A has been compensated for the
entire time including the walk, the time spent waiting to gather the non-
compensable equipment, the time spent donning that equipment, and the walk
to the second station.  Employee B has received no compensation for the
entire time up to donning the compensable equipment at the second work
station.
By allowing compensation for the walking and wait time subsequent to
the donning of compensable equipment, employees may manipulate and
maximize their compensation, especially considering that employers may
leave the order of gathering and place of donning to the discretion
employees.109  Employee A, who has a piece of compensable equipment in his
locker, may first go to his locker and don that equipment and then be
compensated for his subsequent walk to and wait at a station where non-
compensable equipment is gathered and donned.  Employee A may have the
choice of first stopping at the equipment station to pick up and don the non-
compensable equipment and then walk to his locker and don the compensable
equipment, but this will not maximize his economic interest as his walk and
wait time will not be compensated.  Employee B may prefer to stop at the
equipment station or stations that his job requires, and to then go the locker
room to don the equipment, but it is now in his interest to don the protective
equipment which triggers compensation as soon as possible, and to then get
paid for all of his subsequent walking and waiting time.  In addition, if
Employee B has to make two stops, one where equipment that is not
compensable is gathered and one where equipment that is compensable is
gathered, it might be in the best interest of his own efficiency to stop where
the non-compensable equipment is distributed first; however, his economic
interest will promote him to first gather and don the compensable equipment,
even if such donning requires an out-of-the way trip to the locker room.  In
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short, the above examples show that there is much room for employees to
ignore efficiency, and to instead gather and don their equipment in a way to
maximize their compensation.
This differential treatment and possible manipulation creates immediate
difficulties for employers.  First, the possibility that the time spent gathering
and donning compensable and non-compensable gear may be manipulated
imposes additional compensation costs on the employer.  Second, the
aforementioned variations in the way that individuals choose to gather and
don or return and doff the protective equipment will create difficulties in the
employer’s time-keeping system.110  While these issues can be addressed
through court decisions regarding how much time employers should be
compensated for or by the employers themselves, these two processes are not
without costs to employers.  Finally, the different treatment of employees,
based on possible slight variations in their employment situations, may create
hostility between workers as some employees are being compensated for
walking and wait time and others are not.111
While it is true that employers will be able to restructure their plants and
employ new, stricter workplace rules for when, where, and in what order
equipment shall be gathered and donned, a cost is still going to be imposed on
employers.  Such restructuring and the development of new workplace rules
takes time.  This means that in the short-term employers face increased labor
costs, and in the long-term employers face costs associated with restructuring
and designing and implementing new workplace rules.  It should also be noted
that while the above examples deal with employees beginning their workday,
different treatment and manipulation of compensation based on the order in
which equipment is doffed and returned may also take place at the end of the
workday.
C.  Employer Liability
The resolution of these two cases increases employer liability.  First,
while it appears that the line regarding “integral and indispensable” to the
principal activity is being drawn at equipment required for work safety, the
decisions of the First and Ninth Circuit arguably broaden the scope of what is
considered an “integral and indispensable” activity.  The equipment worn by
employees in the meat packing industry and the safety hazards faced by such
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employees are more akin to common industrial and construction work
environments than battery making.  As the National Chicken Council and
American Meat Institute succulently argued in their Amici Curiae Brief, “[t]he
sanitary and protective gear at issue in this case is common to many types of
employment.  Any employer that employs individuals who wear common
types of sanitary and protective attire would be subject to claims for waiting,
walking and travel associated with obtaining, donning, doffing or disposing
of such attire.”112  Moreover, the Supreme’s Court decision that any walking
time occurring subsequent to and prior to engagement in a principal activity
is compensable may also increase the number of lawsuits filed against
employers by their employees.  The opportunity to recover compensation not
only for engagement in a principal activity, but also for any subsequent
walking or travel time, provides employees with additional motivation to file
suit.
Employers not only face a possible increase in lawsuits related to
compensation claims for the donning and doffing of equipment, and any
subsequent or prior walking or travel, but will also be required to analyze their
workplace practices and policies, and to consult counsel regarding possible
lawsuits.  While claims regarding the compensability of donning and doffing
required equipment and subsequent walking have been “pervasive in meat and
poultry processing,”113 similar claims have also been filed “against a wide
variety of public and private employers.”114  Claims for compensation have
been filed by police officers, engineers, truck drivers and a variety of
manufacturing employees including those manufacturing medical supplies,
chlorine and automobiles.115  This decision is likely to increase the number of
suits filed by employees and to increase the variety of employees filing such
suits.116  This may lead to increased costs for employers in the form of
increased litigation, and studies undertaken through company initiative to
determine whether donning and doffing in its employment setting and any
subsequent walking or driving is likely to be compensable.
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D.  Increased Costs for Employer
Along with increased litigation costs, employers may face an immediate
“substantial”117 increase in labor costs.  This can be demonstrated by taking
a close look at what was awarded to IBP employees by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. IBP employs 41,000
workers nationwide;118 the Washington plant employs 178 workers in the
slaughter division and 815 workers in the processing division.119  In the
slaughter division, 110 straight-knife users recovered wages for approximately
9 to 10 minutes of pre-production and post-production time.120  Air knife users
and wizard knife users recovered wages for approximately 5.5 to 6.5 minutes
of pre-production and post-production time.121  While the exact number of
employees using air and wizard knives is not given, this paper will assume a
reasonable number of 8 employees.122  No other positions in the slaughtering
division recovered damages.123  Based on the above figures, 1,093 minutes of
pre-production and post-production time per day, for a total of 5,465 minutes
per week, was awarded slaughtering division employees.124  Assuming an
average wage rate of $10 per hour, the resulting cost to IBP is $911 per week.
As stated above, approximately 800 workers are employed in IBP’s
processing division.125  Knife users, which include 624 of the employees,
recovered wages for between 12 and 14 minutes of pre-production and post-
production time.126  Packaging workers, of which there are 34,127 recovered
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between 6 to 8 minutes of pre-production and post-production time.128
Employees in the lightly-staffed hamburger department were also awarded
wages for between 6 to 8 minutes.129  Processing saw operators recovered
wages for 8 to 10 minutes of pre-production and post-production time,130 and
the remainder of the processing employees were awarded between 1.387 and
2.448 minutes of pre-production and post-production time.131  Assuming that
there are 5 employees in the hamburger department, 33 saw operators and a
remainder of 104 employees in the processing division, 8,881 minutes of pre-
production and post-production time per day, for a total of 44,405 minutes per
week, was awarded to employees in the processing division.132  Assuming an
average wage rate of $10 an hour, the resulting cost to IBP is $7,400 per week.
The increase in labor costs for both the slaughtering and processing division
employees at the Washington plant totals $8,311 per week or $432,172 per
year.  In addition to these labor costs, IBP will also face “costs associated with
developing and implementing new timekeeping systems and practices.”133
In an effort to avoid what will be a marked increase in labor costs over the
life of a company,134 it is likely that companies will restructure their plants to
minimize compensable walking and wait times.  Based on the Alvarez135
decision, it is clear that employers will want to minimize any walking that
takes place after the donning of or before the doffing of any required safety
equipment; this can be done most effectively, in theory, by placing the locker
room or changing station as close as possible to the production floor and
requiring that any donning of required safety equipment take place there.136
In addition, employers should establish one location at which employees
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gather all of their respective required safety equipment as this would eliminate
any possible compensation for walking time between equipment stations after
the donning of required safety equipment, and compensation for any possible
wait time at the second equipment station.137  Lastly, as employees will be
compensated for the walk from the locker room or changing station to the
production floor subsequent to the donning of required safety equipment, it is
in the employer’s best interests to minimize wait times at the time-clocks that
are located at the entrance of the production floor.  Alternatively, employers
may choose to have the time clocks located inside of the locker room or
changing station where the donning and doffing takes place.
As employers attempt to restructure their plants to “avoid or minimize
compensable walking time”138 and compensable wait time, they will face
construction and renovation costs.  Employers will have to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis to weigh where equipment stations and locker rooms can
feasibly be located and the costs of those relocations against labor costs.
While there is little doubt that employers will plan relocations to minimize
their overall costs, the fact still exists that employers are going to see increases
in expenditures because of the Alvarez decision.
Since employers have the ability to restructure their plants to minimize
the compensation employees will receive for walking and wait time
subsequent to the donning of and prior to the doffing of required safety
equipment, employees will see a increased compensation in the short-term.
In the long-term, however, as companies work to minimize donning, doffing
and walking time, the compensation employees receive is likely to go down
again, and employees may see little benefits from this decision.  In addition,
employers may revise wage rates or benefit packages to offset some of the
increased costs.139  Employers, on the other hand, will face both short-term
and long-term costs, whether in the form of labor or restructuring costs.  In
short, there is little doubt that this decision will impose both short- and long-
term costs on employers, but whether employees will truly gain a long-term
benefit is questionable.
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In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez140 raises several
concerns.  While the question of whether the precedent set by the courts’
resolution of these two cases creates the possibility of undermining the
congressional intent behind the Portal-to-Portal Act needs to be kept in mind,
there are more prominent concerns relating to the differential treatment of
relatively similarly situated employees and increased costs for employers.  As
this note has explored, small differences in what employees don and doff,
where employees don and doff, and in what order employees don and doff
protective equipment, will create differences in employee compensation.
While this make sense in legal theory, the application of Alvarez141 to the
reality of the workplace is likely to be perceived as irrational by employees
and their employers.
As employers attempt to minimize their new labor costs and to create a
more uniform compensation time among their employees, the employers may
face costs associated with restructuring the workplace, and developing and
implementing new workplace rules and time-keeping policies.  Moreover,
employers may also be exposed to increased litigation costs, and will have to
consult counsel regarding their potential liability.
Finally, while employers are certain to face increased expenditures as a
result of the Alvarez142 decision, over the course of time, they should be able
to eventually minimize the associated costs.  Given this ability, any long-term
employee benefits are questionable.
